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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has been called a "major force
on [the] Supreme Court,"' the "real" Chief Justice, 2 and "America's
most powerful jurist."' 3  Others have referred to her as "the most
powerful woman in America" 4 and even of "the world.",5  Even
compared to women like Eleanor Roosevelt and Hillary Clinton, there
is no one "who has had a more profound effect on society than any
other American woman... If someone else had been appointed to her
position on the court, our nation might now be living under different
rules for abortion, affirmative action, race, religion in school and civil
rights. We might well have a different president." 6  Former Acting
Solicitor General Walter Dellinger noted, "What is most striking is the
assurance with which this formerly obscure state court judge
effectively decides many hugely important questions for a country of
275 million people.",7 As one journalist put it, "We are all living in
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2004, at W 10. See also Tony Mauro, Under Justice O'Connor's Centrist Spell, Many of the
Court's Conservative Trends Seemed to Stall, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REv., July 1, 2003, at 7;
Jeffrey Rosen, The O'Connor Court: America's Most Powerful Jurist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June
3, 2001, at 32.
3. Rosen, supra note 2, at 32.
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PRESS July 18, 2000 at 9A.
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Sandra Day O'Connor's America." 8 "[S]he can bend the court - and
the law - to her will." 9 Thomas Goldstein, an attorney who regularly
appears before the Court, said that the impact of Justice O'Connor's
retirement would resemble "thermonuclear war." 10
Drawing largely from the social science literature on judicial
decision-making theory, the purpose of this analysis is to provide a
statistical overview of Justice O'Connor's decision-making behavior.
Using a wide variety of measures of potential influence, we look at
patterns in her opinion writing and her position as a potential swing
vote on the Court. A general assessment of her opinion writing
suggests that she does not write any more majority or concurring
opinions than her colleagues. In majority opinions, this "equality
principle" rules on the Rehnquist Court. Moreover, she writes a
remarkably average number of concurring opinions. But a closer
assessment of particular subsets of cases, such as civil liberties
decisions, 5-4 decisions, and landmark decisions, suggests a very
different picture. It is in these cases, arguably the most important
decisions by the Court, that she does indeed appear to be the most
influential.
We concede, however, that even an in-depth statistical analysis
does not tell the entire story about Justice O'Connor's possible
influence on the bench and on the contours of American law. A good
example of this is the Court's 2000 decision in Stenberg v. Carhart,11
the most recent abortion case. Simply counting this case as one in
which Justice O'Connor was in the majority in a 5-4 decision misses
the fact that it was in Stenberg that a majority finally adopted Justice
O'Connor's "undue burden" test, an approach that she had been
advocating since her dissent in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health in 1983.12 On the other hand, a statistical
overview helps to provide a much broader context for understanding
her influence, how it has evolved over time, and how her decision-
making behavior compares to other Justices.' 3
8. Rosen, supra note 2, at 32.
9. Lazarus, supra note 5, at 9A.
10. Mauro, supra note 2, at 7.
11. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
12. 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983). Interestingly, in 1989 in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services, Justice Scalia noted in his concurring opinion that Justice O'Connor's approach
"cannot be taken seriously" 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989).
13. One of the problems with much of what has been written about Justice O'Connor as
a swing voter, for example, is that it is based on analyses of a single term, see, e.g., Charles
Rothfeld, The Court on Balance: By Sometimes Leaning Left, Justice O'Connor Centers the
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II. THE "FEMININE" SWING VOTER?
A. Opinion Writing
Much attention has been paid to Justice O'Connor as the first
woman to serve on the Supreme Court and the impact of gender on her
decision making, with special attention given to her tendency to write
concurring opinions. Shortly after her arrival on the bench, for
example, Suzanna Sherry provided an analysis of Justice O'Connor's
"feminine jurisprudence,"' 4 borrowing from Carol Gilligan's theory of
the "different voice." 15  In contrast to a traditional liberal legal
approach that defines inherent rights as belonging to atomistic
individuals, a "feminine jurisprudence" focuses on an individual's
relationship to others and the impact of that individual's decision on
the community. Feminine jurisprudence rejects "an adversarial,
dichotomous, zero-sum game perspective of the issues" presented in a
case, instead it offers concessions to both sides to find a compromise.
6
After comparing her to Chief Justice Rehnquist, Sherry concluded that
Justice O'Connor's "emerging jurisprudence ... exhibits a
characteristically feminine perspective in its emphasis on contextual
Supreme Court, LEGAL TIMES, July 12, 2004, at 52; Marcia Coyle, Is Rehnquist Tinkering with
Revolution? NAT'L L. J., Aug. 16, 1999, at B7; Marcia Coyle, Swing Votes Inject Suspense
Into New Term, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 7, 1996, at Al; a particular issue, see, e.g., ROBERT ZELNICK,
SWING DANCE: JUSTICE O'CONNOR AND THE MICHIGAN MUDDLE (2004); or even a single case,
see, e.g., High Court Ruling: Be Prepared to Show ID, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, June 22,
2004, at A8; John Dendahl, Editorial, Sayonara, Disclosure: Big Money Back, SANTA FE NEW
MEXICAN, May 30, 2004, at Fl; Michael McGough, Top Court: Ministry Students can be
Denied Scholarships, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 2004, at A8; Bill Mears, Disabled Win
Victory in Ruling Over Access to Government Buildings, CNN.com, May 17, 2004, at
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/05/17/scouts.disabled/index.html; Robert Greenberger and
Joni James, End Game: With Electorate Split, Presidential Drama is in Hands of Few Actors
- If High Court Doesn 't Have Last Word on the Race, Meet People Who Would - Justice
O'Connor in Spotlight, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2000, at Al. But see David Margolick et al.,
The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR, Oct. 2004, at 310.
14. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional
Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543 (1986).
15. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT (1982). Gilligan's work in psychology had a major impact on the development
of the idea of "feminine jurisprudence." See, e.g. Lucinda Finley, Breaking Women 's Silence
in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
886 (1989); Kenneth Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447 (1984); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
16. Susan Behuniak-Long, Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor and the Power of Maternal
Legal Thinking, 54 REV. OF POL. 417, 427 (1992).
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decisionmaking."' 7  Justice O'Connor's fact-based approach to the
law, which typically articulates a "middle ground," is clearly drawn
"from her femininity rather than her politics."'' 8
One of the strongest pieces of evidence offered for her
feminine jurisprudence was not only her propensity to write
concurring opinions, but also the content of those opinions; concurring
opinions provide the perfect vehicle for this different voice to be
expressed. 19 Her concurring opinions in abortion cases are said to be
quintessential examples of "maternal legal thinking.' '20 For example,
in cases involving minors and parental notification, Justice
O'Connor's approach shows an "unwillingness to apply an abstract,
general principle to every individual family situation" and provides a
compromise. Moreover, she uses this approach to provide the
critical swing vote in these cases, thus increasing her influence on the
Court and the law.
22
Still others, however, have found very little evidence for a
feminine voice in her jurisprudence. 23 In equal protection cases, for
example, the members of the Supreme Court that did exhibit a
"different voice" were some of the male Justices.24 Moreover, the
other woman on the Court, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, also has
shown no signs of using this approach to deciding cases. 25  Thus,
Justice O'Connor's unique fact-based jurisprudence of compromise
and concession is arguably not a product of her gender. Instead, it
could be a reflection of the fact that she is the only justice on the
Supreme Court with any legislative experience; prior to her career as a
judge, she served in the Arizona state senate and became the majority
leader, a position that demanded an understanding of the importance of
17. Sherry, supra note 14, at 604-605.
18. Id., at 613.
19. See, e.g., id. at 606; Behuniak-Long, supra note 16, at 422.
20. Behuniak-Long, supra note 16, at 437. See Patricia Sullivan and Steven Goldzwig,
Abortion and Undue Burdens: Justice Sandra Day 0 'Connor and Judicial Decision-Making,
16 WOMEN AND POL. 27 (1996).
21. Behuniak-Long, supra note 16, at 435.
22. See generally Sullivan and Goldzwig, supra note 20; Sherry, supra note 14.
23. Sue Davis, The Voice of Sandra Day O'Connor, 77 JUDICATURE 134 (1993);
ROBERT VAN SICKEL, NOT A PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT VOICE (1998).
24. See Jilda Aliotta, Justice O'Connor and the Equal Protection Clause: A Feminine
Voice?, 78 JUDICATURE 232 (1995).
25. Chris Bonneau and Ralph Baker, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the "Feminine
Voice," presented at the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting (April 15-17,
1999) (on file with author).
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compromise and concession.26  In fact, Justice O'Connor herself has
been very critical of the idea that her jurisprudence, or any other
woman judge's for that matter, can be called "feminine" and attributed
to gender. She considers this "New Feminism" quite troubling,
"because it so neatly echoes the Victorian myth of the 'True Woman'
that kept women out of law for so long." 7 She argues that, "Asking
whether women attorneys speak with a 'different voice' than men do is
a question that is both dangerous and unanswerable.
'
"
28
Regardless of whether they exhibit a different voice or not,
much has been made about Justice O'Connor's tendency to write
concurring opinions.29 In fact, Justice O'Connor has been called "the
great concurrer." 30  There is some debate, however, about what
concurring opinions really mean. Nancy Maveety, for example, has
argued that, for Justice O'Connor, concurring opinions are a conscious
strategy to maximize her power and leadership on the Court. 31 Writing
a concurring opinion is "a tactic of influence that permits both alliance
with the winning coalition and assertion of one's own distinctive legal
reasoning. ' 32  Justice Scalia has commented that separate opinions
26. In fact, she was the first woman in the country to ever be the majority leader of a
state legislature. NANCY MAVEETY, JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR: STRATEGIST ON THE
SUPREME COURT (1996). See also Sue Davis, The Voice of Sandra Day O'Connor, 77
JUDICATURE 134 (1993); ROBERT VAN SICKEL, NOT A PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT VOICE
(1998).
27. Sandra Day O'Connor, Address to New York University Law School, reprinted as
The Wisdom of Women, THE RECORDER, December 20, 1991 at 6.
28. Id. Regardless of whether her opinions reflect a different voice or not, what is clear
is that Justice O'Connor's presence has had an impact on the Court's approach to sex-
discrimination cases. In the wake of her appointment, the Court's overall support for women's
claims in sex-discrimination cases increased from 63% to 75%, and there was a noticeable
change in support among the male Justices. Karen O'Connor and Jeff Segal, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor and the Supreme Court's Reaction to Its First Female Member, 10 WOMEN
AND POL. 95 (1990). Justice O'Connor has voted for the "pro-equality" position in over 80%
of these women's rights cases and has written more opinions in this area than all of the current
justices, more than would be expected based on the length of her tenure on the Court. Barbara
Palmer, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and the Supreme Court's Reaction to Its Second Female
Member, 24 WOMEN AND POL. 1, 8 (2002). But for more critical analyses of her written
opinions in this area, see also Nadine Taub, Sandra Day O'Connor and Women's Rights, 13
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 113 (1991); Margaret Miller, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor: Token or
Triumph from a Feminist Perspective, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 493 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Robert Riggs, Justice O'Connor: A First Term Appraisal, 1983 BYU L.
REv. 1 (1983); Miller, supra note 28; Stuart Taylor, Swing Vote on the Constitution, AM.
LAW., June 1989, at 66.
30. Alexander Wohl, O'Connor, J., Concurring, 75 A.B.A. J. 42,42 (1989).
31. MAVEETY, supra note 26, at 49.
32. Id. at 61.
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"augment ... the prestige of the Court" and keep "the Court in the
forefront of the intellectual development of the law." 33
In fact, Justice O'Connor "has spoken most effectively in her
concurring voice." 34 Her separate opinions have had a major impact in
a wide variety of civil rights and civil liberties cases.35 An excellent
example of this is Justice O'Connor's undue burden test in abortion
cases, which was originally articulated in a dissenting opinion,36 then a
3 38concurring opinion, and eventually a majority opinion.
Others have a much different view of concurring opinions, that
they are actually a reflection of "judicial ego." 39 Concurring opinions
reflect a lack of judicial restraint and are "unnecessary nitpicking. 4 °
C. Herman Pritchett has argued that concurring opinions weaken the
Court's "institutional ethos"4 as "they invite uncertainty and confusion
about the Court's rulings, interpretation of the law, and policy-
making.",4 2 Even when Justice Ginsburg was on the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia, she suggested that "appellate judges
might profitably exercise greater restraint before writing separately.A 3
The bottom line is that concurring opinions have no immediate
precedential value.44 Even Chief Justice Rehnquist once lamented that
the Court was a "virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definite
principles can be drawn., 4 5  Thus, rather than an indication of
influence, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinions have also been used
as evidence that she is "unskilled or uninterested in bargaining, [a]
stubborn[] individual[] unwilling to compromise. 46
33. Antonin Scalia, The Dissenting Opinion, 1994 J. SuP. CT. HIST. 33, 39, 41-42
(1994).
34. MAVEETY, supra note 26, at 69.
35. Id. at 62-68.
36. Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 US 416, 453 (1983).
37. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 522 (1989)
38. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
39. MAVEETY, supra note 26, at 53.
40. JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL 277 (1993). See also Robert Bennett, A Dissent on Dissent, 74 JUDICATURE 255
(1991).
41. C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 22 (1954).
42. DAVID O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 336 (1996).
43. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH L. REV. 133
(1990).
44. See Igor Kirman, Standing Apart to be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme
Court Concurring Opinions, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2083 (1995).
45. Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 569 (1981).
46. Segal & Spaeth, supra note 40, at 296.
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What seems clear is that concurring and dissenting opinions
can be an indicator that a Justice has particularly strong feelings or a
different approach to an issue within a case.47 Whether Justice
O'Connor actually writes separate opinions any more often than her
colleagues still needs to be determined. If nothing else, assessing
patterns in her opinion writing can provide some insights into whether
or not she does take a different approach more often than the other
Justices and her potential influence on the Court.48
B. Swing Voters and 5-4 Decisions
Justice O'Connor's power has been attributed to her being the
"swing" or "key" vote on the Court.49 Attorneys who bring cases to
the Court are often said to write their briefs and tailor their oral
arguments to her.50 Jay Sekulow, from the American Center for Law
and Justice, remarked that, "I do think O'Connor is the pivotal vote on
any case before the Supreme Court.",5' As Thomas Goldstein noted,
"Justice O'Connor decides all the cases." 52  There are a variety of
ways to define "swing vote," but typically there are two factors that
are used as an indicator: the position of the Justice in 5-4 decisions
and the ideological position of the Justice relative to the rest of the
bench. The idea is that the Justice is typically a moderate that the
Court pivots around in close cases.53  Justice Powell was considered
by many to be the perfect example of a swing voter; he was an
ideological moderate and often provided the key vote in 5-4 decisions
47. MAVEETY, supra note 26, at 53. See also Lewis Kornhauser & Lawrence Sage, The
One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1993); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT (1983).
48. See, e.g., Harold Spaeth & Michael Altfeld, Influence Relationships within the
Supreme Court: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, 38 W. POL. Q. 70 (1985);
Michael Altfeld & Harold Spaeth, Measuring Influence on the U.S. Supreme Court, 24
JURIMETRICS J. 236 (1984).
49. See, e.g., Charles Kelso and Randall Kelso, Sandra Day O'Connor: A Justice Who
Has Made a Difference in Constitutional Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REv. 915 (2001). See also
id. at 921 n.13.
50. Lane, supra note 2, at W10.
51. Marcia Coyle, Swing Votes Inject Suspense Into New Term, NAT'L L. J., October 7,
1996, Al.
52. Interview with Thomas Goldstein, Founding Partner, Goldstein & Howe, P.C., in
Washington, D.C. (October 8, 2004).
53. See, e.g., Robert Riggs, When Every Vote Counts: 5-4 Decisions in the United
States Supreme Court, 1900-90, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667 (1993); Janet Blasecki, Justice
Lewis F. Powell: Swing Voter or Staunch Conservative? 52 J. POL. 532 (1990).
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in civil liberties cases.54  On the other hand, other analyses have
indicated that this was, in fact, a myth, given his consistently
conservative voting record.55 In fact, in one study of all 5-4 decisions
and ideological voting patterns from 1900 to 1990, none of the Justices
since 1940 could be classified as a swing voter, but there have been
some Justices who have held this position on the Court for a single
term.56
Like the history of writing separate opinions, 5-4 decisions are
also a relatively recent phenomenon on the Court. In fact, the number
of cases decided by a single vote increased simultaneously with the
number of concurring and dissenting opinions written by the Justices;
this is considered another indicator of the decline in consensual norms
on the Court that occurred during the 1940s.57 Five to four decisions,
like separate opinions, are also considered by some to be an indication
of institutional weakness: "a 5-4 decision emphasizes the strength of
the losing side and may encourage resistance and evasion. The greater
the majority, the greater the appearance of certainty., 58 Cases decided
by "minimum winning coalitions" produce "unstable precedents" that
are more easily overturned in the wake of membership changes.59
In addition to 5-4 decisions being unstable over subsequent
terms, there is evidence that such decisions are unstable even within a
single case. For example, during the Warren Court, in 20% of 5-4
cases, the original coalition in the initial vote on the merits broke apart
during the opinion drafting process and the majority became the
minority in the Court's final decision.6 °  In cases with larger
54. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, Strength at the Center, N. Y. TIMES, June 30, 1987, at
A3 1; Stuart Taylor, Justice Powell Shaping Law as Swing Man on High Court, N. Y. Times,
April 26, 1987, at Al; David O'Brien, The Reagan Judges: His Most Enduring Legacy?, in
THE REAGAN LEGACY: PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE (Charles 0. Jones ed., 1988) ("Powell
was not just the pivotal vote on the Court; in his last two terms, the justices ruled 5 to 4 in
eighty-one cases, and Powell had the controlling vote over 75 percent of the time.").
55. Blasecki, supra note 53. See also Riggs, supra note 53.
56. Riggs, supra note 53, at 707-08.
57. Id. at 712 tbl 1.
58. WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 66 (1964).
59. Saul Brenner, Timothy M. Hagle, & Harold J. Spaeth, Increasing the Size of
Minimum Winning Original Coalitions on the Warren Court, 23 POLITY 309, 307 (1990).
60. Saul Brenner & Harold J. Spaeth, Majority Opinion Assignments and the
Maintenance of the Original Coalition on the Warren Court, 32 AM. J. POL. SCI. 72, 77
(1988). See also Saul Brenner, Timothy M. Hagle & Harold J. Spaeth, The Defection of the
Marginal Justice on the Warren Court, 42 W. POL. Q. 409 (1989). Typically, opinion writers
produce about three drafts for a case, but Justice Brennan is said to have circulated as many as
ten drafts of one case before one was accepted by the majority, O'Brien, supra note 54, at 307.
2004] The World's Most Powerful Jurist? 219
majorities, the original coalition only broke up 1% of the time.61
During the opinion drafting process, the majority opinion author is
mindful that Justices can switch sides at any time before the final
decision is announced, and there is a great deal of evidence that this
does occur with some regularity. 62  During the Burger Court, for
example, in over one-third of all cases, at least one Justice changed his
vote during the course of exchanging opinion drafts.
63
Unfortunately, recent data on the "vote fluidity" of Justice
O'Connor is not available. It should be noted, however, that during
her first decade on the Court, almost one-fourth of all cases were
decided by a 5-4 vote.64  For example, in Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School District and Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education,66 two of the Court's landmark Title IX cases, Justice
O'Connor wrote the majority opinions. In these 5-4 decisions that
were only a year apart, the minority in Gebser became the majority in
Davis. She was clearly the "pivot point" on the Court. At any rate, an
examination of her ideology, voting behavior, and opinion writing in
5-4 decisions can provide more insight into her influence on the
bench.67
61. Brenner & Spaeth, supra note 60, at 77.
62. See e.g., J. Woodford Howard, On the Fluidity ofJudicial Choice, 62 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 43 (1968); WALTER MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY (1964).
63. Forrest Maltzman & Paul Wahlbeck, Strategic Policy Considerations and Voting
Fluidity on the Burger Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 581 (1996). Switching sides is an
integral part of the process of "negotiation and accommodation" during opinion writing. In
order to prevail on the merits, majority opinion writers know they must convince at least four
of their colleagues to agree with them. Thus, Justices pursue their policy goals by negotiating
over the language in a written opinion and accommodating requests from their colleagues to
change everything from punctuation to footnotes to entire opinions. "For Justices, bargaining
is a simple fact of life." MURPHY, supra note 58, at 57. See also David Rohde, Policy Goals
and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme Court, 16 MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 208 (1972); WILLIAM
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT: How IT WAS, How IT IS (William Morrow 1987);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT (Oxford University Press 1993);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION (Oxford University Press 1996); James Spriggs, Forrest
Maltzman, & Paul Wahlbeck, Bargaining on the U.S. Supreme Court: Justices' Responses to
Majority Opinion Drafts, 61 J. POL. 485 (1999); Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs, II &
Forrest Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United
States Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294 (1998) (showing that accommodation is
influenced strongly by strategic concerns of the majority opinion author); PHILLIP COOPER,
BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1995) (describing how
members of the Supreme Court find ways to work together in a conflict-ridden environment).
64. Riggs, supra note 53, at 668.
65. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
66. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
67. Justice Powell's papers, available at Washington and Lee University, have the most
complete docket books which provide information about initial conference votes which can be
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III. ANALYSIS
In our attempt to determine whether Justice O'Connor is
indeed as powerful as court-watchers proclaim, we developed several
measures of judicial influence. These measures include general
indicators of opinion writing and voting behavior, as well as more
specific analyses of 5-4 decisions and landmark cases. Most of our
research covers the 1994-2002 terms, which covers almost all of the
current natural court.68  In some instances, we provide data since
Justice O'Connor's appointment in 1981 to assess possible changes
over time.
A. Justice O'Connor's Opinion Writing
Before we look at separate opinions, it is useful to assess
majority opinion writing to provide an overall context and baseline for
comparison. Thus, our initial examination of patterns in opinion
writing focuses on majority opinions for all cases from the 1994-2002
terms. The results are featured in the first column of Table 1, in which
the Justices are listed in descending frequency of their majority
opinion writing. The "equality principle" suggests that majority
opinion writing should be distributed equally among the nine Justices,
69i.e. the workload is shared. Chief Justice Rehnquist has remarked
that he has tried to "be as evenhanded as possible" with his opinion
assignments. 7° The exception to this is landmark decisions, when the
Chief Justice tends to self-assign more often.71
compared to final votes on the merits. Thus, an assessment of Justice O'Connor's early years
on the bench can be conducted with data from Justice Powell's papers. Thus, in future
research, we hope to assess whether Justice O'Connor was more likely to change her mind in
5-4 decisions, or in general, compared to her colleagues.
68. A "natural court" refers to a group of justices who serve together between personnel
changes. In other words, there is no change in the justices, so we do not have to control for
length of service. Where we go beyond the current natural court, we do account for length of
service in our calculations. When Justice Rehnquist retires, this will be the end of one of the
longest natural courts in the Supreme Court's history. Our analyses stop with the 2002 term,
because this is the most recent term that data are available.
69. See, e.g., Elliot Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court? Majority Opinion Assignmentfrom Taft to Burger, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 60, 62-66 (1979).
70. REHNQUIST, supra note 63, at 297.
71. Slotnick, supra note 69, at 67; REHNQUIST, supra note 63, at 297.
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Table 1. Opinion Writing for the Court on All Cases for 1994-2002
Tprm¢
20041
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Rehnquist 12.8 (89) 1.5(11) 4.5(34)
O'Connor 11.8 (82) 6.4 (48) 4.9 (37)
Ginsburg 11.2 (78) 5.8(43) 6.4(48)
Stevens 11.0 (77) 7.8 (58) 19.9 (149)
Kennedy 11.0 (77) 6.2 (46) 3.9 (29)
Scalia 10.9 (76) 10.4 (78) 11.5 (86)
Breyer 10.6 (74) 6.2(46) 10.4 (78)
Souter 10.5 (73) 5.1 (38) 8.2 (61)
Thomas 10.2(71) 7.1 (53) 9.5(71)
Total Decisions 697 747 747
Equality Principle 11.1(77)
(dividing total by
9)
Cell entries are column percentages with actual number of opinions in parentheses. Justices
are listed by their ranking in majority opinion writing (from most to least). Data taken from
Harvard Law Review, 1995-2003, Statistics, Table IA Actions of Individual Justices (see
footnote in originals for detailed definition of opinion writing categories).
During the 1994-2002 terms, 697 cases were decided with full
plenary review.72  Thus, under the equality principle, each Justice
should have written 11%, or approximately 77 opinions of the Court.
In general, we find substantial support for the equality principle, with
four Justices (Ginsburg, Stevens, Kennedy, and Scalia) falling within
one opinion of the expected number. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist has
written slightly more than the equality principle would suggest; he has
written 12.8% of the majority opinions. Justice O'Connor ranks
second after the Chief Justice; she has written 11.8% of majority
72. The Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372 (1994-1995); The Statistics, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 340, 340 (1995-1996); The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1996-1997); The
Statistics, 111 HARv. L. REV. 431, 431 (1997-1998); The Statistics, 112 HARv. L. REV. 366,
366 (1998-1999); The Statistics, 113 HARv. L. REV. 400, 400 (1999-2000); The Statistics, 114
HARV. L. REV. 390, 390 (2000-2001); The Statistics, 115 HARv. L. REV. 539, 539 (2001-
2002). From 1994-2002, the Court issued 50 per curiam decisions. The Statistics, 108 HARv.
L. REV. 372, 372 (1994-1995); The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 340 (1995-1996); The
Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 367 (1996-1997); The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431,
431 (1997-1998); The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 366 (1998-1999); The Statistics, 113
HARv. L. REV. 400, 400 (1999-2000); The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 390 (2000-
2001); The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 539 (2001-2002).
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opinions during this time, which is only five more opinions than
predicted by the equality principle. Justices Breyer, Souter, and
Thomas fall just below the predictions, writing 10.6%, 10.5%, and
10.2% of majority decisions respectively. Thus, the data confirm that
the Court follows the equality principle in majority opinion
assignment.
73
Of course, Justices are free to write separately if they wish. As
noted earlier, there is some disagreement on what concurring opinions
really mean, but they do give us some insight into Justice O'Connor's
potential influence, or at least how she compares to other Justices'
opinion writing behavior. The second column of Table 1 features the
number of concurring opinions written by each Justice during the
1994-2002 terms.74 The percentage refers to the number of
concurrences written in the total number of decisions during this time
period. Although the conventional wisdom suggests that Justice
O'Connor concurs' more than other Justices, our data do not support
this assumption. In fact, for the years included here, Justice
O'Connor's concurrence rate of 6.4% puts her near the middle of the
pack. Justice Scalia, however, stands out as the leader with a rate of
73. Opinion assignment, of course, is not evenly distributed. If the Chief Justice is in
the majority, he assigns the opinion. If he is not in the majority, the most senior justice
assigns the opinion. For example, during the 2001 and 2002 terms, Chief Justice Rehnquist
was in the majority in the final opinion issued on the merits in 79.6% of all of the cases
decided during those two terms. The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 390 tbl. 1-D (2000-
2001); The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REv. 539, 539 tbl. I-D (2001-2002). This suggests that in
almost 80% of the cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist is assigning the majority opinion. It is
probably a safe assumption that Justice Stevens, who is the next most senior justice and one of
the most ideological distant justices from Rehnquist, is assigning the opinions in the other
20% of cases. Although data beyond the 2001 and 2002 terms are not readily available, it
appears that Chief Justice Rehnquist does assign the vast majority of opinions, and as a result,
can enforce the equality principle. It is important to keep in mind, however, that we do not
know how often Chief Justice Rehnquist had initially voted in conference in the minority and
then changed his vote to be in the majority; in those instances, he would not have assigned the
opinion. And we do know that justices change their minds relatively often. Even conceding
that, Chief Justice Rehnquist controls the opinion assignment in the vast majority of cases.
And even if he does not, the data in Table 1 suggest that a commitment to the equality
principle is shared by the most senior members of the Court. The authors would like to thank
Dean Richard Boldt for raising this issue during the Town Hall meeting.
74. Data compiled from The Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REv. 372, 372 (1994-1995); The
Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 340, 340 (1995-1996); The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REv. 367,
367 (1996-1997); The Statistics, 111 HARV.-L. REv. 431,431 (1997-1998); The Statistics, 112
HARv. L. REv. 366, 366 (1998-1999); The Statistics, 113 HARv. L. REv. 400, 400 (1999-
2000); The Statistics, 114 HARv. L. REv. 390, 390 (2000-2001); The Statistics, 115 HARV. L.
REv. 539, 539 (2001-2002). Opinions that concurred in part and dissented in part were
counted as dissents exclusively.
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10.4%. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Chief Justice Rehnquist
has a concurrence rate of merely 1.5%.
With regard to dissenting opinions, Justice Stevens ranks far
ahead of the other Justices, dissenting in nearly one-fifth of all cases
and writing almost twice as many dissents as his colleagues (as
evidenced in the final column of Table 1). The only other Justices
dissenting in more than 10% of all cases are Scalia and Breyer. By
contrast, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Chief Justice
Rehnquist rank at the bottom, each writing dissents in less than 5% of
the Court's decisions.
We expanded our analysis to cover Justice O'Connor's full
tenure on the Court to see if there have been any changes in her
separate-opinion writing behavior. Table 2 displays the concurrence
rates for the fifteen Justices who served since 198 1.75 The rates were
calculated by dividing each Justice's total number of concurring
opinions by the total number of decisions for his/her years of service.
Two striking findings emerge from Table 2. Once again, there is little
evidence, at least in terms of frequency, that Justice O'Connor is "the
great concurrer." 76 In fact, she ranks sixth among the fifteen Justices
who served during this time, with a concurrence rate of 6.6%. Most of
the Justices concurred in 5-7% of the Court's decisions, and Justice
O'Connor is squarely within this range.
75. The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304 (1982-1983); The Statistics, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 295, 295 (1983-1984); The Statistics, 98 HARv. L. REV. 307, 307 (1984-1985); The
Statistics, 99 HARv. L. REV. 322, 322 (1985-1986); The Statistics, 100 HARV. L. REV. 304, 304
(1986-1987); The Statistics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 362, 362 (1987-1988); The Statistics, 102
HARV. L. REV. 350, 350 (1988-1989); The Statistics, 103 HARv. L. REV. 394, 394 (1989-1990);
The Statistics, 104 HARV. L. REV. 359, 359 (1990-1991); The Statistics, 105 HARV. L. REV.
419,419 (1991-1992); The Statistics, 106 HARV. L. REV. 378, 378 (1992-1993); The Statistics,
107 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372 (1993-199.).
76. Wohl, supra note 30, at 42.
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Table 2. Concurrence Rates for all Justices for 1981-2002 Terms.
Justice Concurrence rates Years of Service*
Scalia 12.3 (217) 1986-2002
Stevens 8.3 (213) 1981-2002
Brennan 7.0(97) 1981-1989
Thomas 6.7 (71) 1991-2002
Kennedy 6.6 (106) 1987-2002
O'Connor 6.6 (169) 1981-2002
Blackmun 6.3 (115) 1981-1993
Ginsburg 6.3 (53) 1993-2002
Breyer 6.2 (46) 1994-2002
Powell 6.1 (58) 1981-1986
White 5.4(93) 1981-1992
Burger 5.4(43) 1981-1985
Souter 5.3 (63) 1990-2002
Marshall 2.7(40) 1981-1990
Rehnquist 1.6(40) 1981-2002
Justices are listed by their ranking in concurrence opinion writing (from most to least). Cell
entries reflect the number of concurrences divided by the total number of decisions during
each Justice's time on the Court during the 1981-2002 terms. Numbers in parentheses are the
total number of concurrences written by a Justice. Data compiled from HARVARD LAW
REVIEW, 1982-2003, Statistics, Table IA Actions of Individual Justices (see footnote in
originals for detailed definition of opinion writing categories).
*Years of service refer only to the years served during the 1981-2002 terms, overlapping with
Justice O'Connor's years on the bench.
The other interesting finding from Table 2 is the remarkably
high concurrence rate for Justice Scalia. At 12.3%, he concurs more
frequently than any other Justice by a wide margin. In fact, Justice
Scalia concurs nearly one and a half times more often than the second
most frequent concurrer, Justice Stevens. Further, Justice Scalia
concurs nearly twice as often as most other Justices.
In order to gain a better understanding of Justice Scalia's
remarkably high concurrence rate and Justice O'Connor's surprisingly
average concurrence rate, we compared the annual concurrence rates
for these two Justices. The results appear in Table 3. In every year
except 1994, Justice Scalia wrote a concurring opinion more often than
Justice O'Connor.7 7 Over time, Justice O'Connor's concurrence rate
has remained substantially unchanged.
77. In 1994, Justice O'Connor concurred in 15.1% of the Court's decisions, by far her
highest rate of concurrence during her time on the bench.
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Table 3. Annual Concurrence Rates of Justices O'Connor and Scalia
for 1981-2002 Terms.
Term Justice O'Connor Justice Scalia
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
7.2(12)
4.3 (7)
6.1 (10)
7.3(11)
7.5(12)
7.2(11)
5.6(8)
8.4 (12)
5.0(7)
3.3(4)
9.5(11)
6.1 (7)
10.3 (9)
15.1 (13)
2.5 (2)
7.0(6)
3.2 (3)
3.7(3)
7.8(6)
3.5 (3)
7.4(6)
7.7 (6)
Average (all years) 5.9 ---
Average (1986-2002) 5.7 12.1
Cell entries reflect the number of concurrences for the term divided by the total number of
decisions during each term. Numbers in parentheses are the number of concurrences written
by a Justice. Data compiled from HARVARD LAW REVIEW, 1982-2003, Statistics, Table IA
Actions of Individual Justices (see footnote in originals for detailed definition of opinion
writing categories).
Given Justice Scalia's past public remarks about concurring
opinions and their contributions to the prestige of the Court, perhaps
this is not unexpected. 8 While he votes with the majority frequently,
78. Another interpretation might be that Justice Scalia is the Justice with the most
"different voice" on the Court.
11.2 (17)
10.6 (15)
16.1 (23)
12.9 (18)
15.0 (18)
13.8 (16)
11.4 (13)
21.8(19)
10.5 (9)
8.9 (7)
10.5 (9)
11.8 (11)
8.6 (7)
10.4 (8)
12.8 (11)
11.1 (9)
9.0 (7)
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he often has different reasons for his vote than the other Justices in the
majority.
Our findings with regard to overall opinion writing indicate
first that the equality principle applies to majority opinions; Justice
O'Connor, for the most part, writes her share of majority opinions, as
do the other Justices. Further, our analyses of separate opinions find
that Justice O'Connor is hardly the "great concurrer," writing a
strikingly average number of concurring opinions relative to her
colleagues. The data indicate that Justice Scalia is, in fact, more
deserving of this title.
B. Justice 0 'Connor and Swing Voting
The preceding analyses indicate that Justice O'Connor's
opinion writing places her in an average position of influence on this
Court. Yet, judicial influence can also be measured by voting
behavior, particularly swing voting. One indicator of whether Justices
are swing voters is their ideology relative to their colleagues; the idea
is that a swing voter is in the ideological center of the Court. One way
of assessing relative ideology is agreement rates. We begin by looking
at Justice O'Connor's agreement rates with the other Justices during
the 1994-2002 terms, using the data from the HARVARD LAW REVIEW.
Agreement rates are defined as "the number of times that one Justice
voted with another in full opinions, including ... per curiam decisions
containing sufficient legal reasoning to be considered full opinions. 79
High agreement rates with many Justices suggest a possible position of
influence. Conversely, lower agreement rates indicate potentially less
influence. Table 4 shows Justice O'Connor's annual agreement rates
with each of the other Justices for the 1994-2002 terms.80
79. The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 340, 341-342 (1995-1996). "Two Justices are
considered to have agreed whenever they joined the same opinion, as indicated by either the
reporter or the explicit statement of a Justice in the body of his or her own opinion. The table
does not treat two Justices as having agreed if they did not join the same opinion, even if they
agreed in the result of the case and wrote separate opinions revealing very little philosophical
disagreement." Id. at 342.
80. The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REv. 340, 341 (1995-1996); The Statistics, I 10 HARV.
L. REV. 367, 368 (1996-1997); The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REv. 431, 432 (1997-1998); The
Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REv. 336, 367 (1998-1999); The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400,
401 (1999-2000); The Statistics, 114 HARv. L. REv. 390, 391 (2000-2001); The Statistics, 115
HARv. L. REv. 539, 540 (2001-2002); The Statistics, 116 HARv. L. REv. 453, 454 (2002-
2003).
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Table 4. Agreement Rates Between Justice O'Connor and Other
Iiitic. for the 1994--2002 Terms.
Entries show percentage of agreement. Bold entries indicate the Justiceks) witn me hignest
agreement rate with Justice O'Connor for each year. Data compiled from Harvard Law
Review, 1995-2003, Statistics, Table IB, Voting Alignments, Percentages (see footnote in
originals for detailed definition of agreement).
Justice O'Connor's agreement rates suggest that she may
indeed be in a powerful position. In an average year, six Justices
agreed with Justice O'Connor more than two-thirds of the time. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor have the highest average
agreement rate81 at 80.4%; these two Justices have the highest annual
agreement rate in six of the nine years examined here. The average
annual agreement rate between Justices Kennedy and O'Connor is also
81. The average agreement rate is the mean of the annual agreement rates.
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Term Rehnquist Stevens Scalia Kennedy
1994 76.7 55.3 68.2 75.6
1995 79.7 59.7 72.2 78.5
1996 78.8 55.3 78.8 80.0
1997 84.8 62.0 72.8 85.9
1998 82.5 46.3 77.5 80.0
1999 88.0 26.0 50.0 72.0
2000 81.0 57.1 71.4 79.8
2001 72.7 61.0 61.8 72.7
2002 79.2 61.0 64.9 72.7
Average 80.4 53.7 68.6 77.5
Term Souter Thomas Ginsburg Breyer
1994 76.7 67.4 64.7 74.4
1995 78.5 71.8 68.4 74.7
1996 70.6 80.0 69.4 67.1
1997 72.8 78.3 65.2 75.0
1998 68.8 75.0 62.5 68.4
1999 44.0 58.0 48.0 58.0
2000 65.1 72.6 66.7 67.5
2001 77.9 57.1 62.3 65.8
2002 74.0 63.2 67.5 73.7
Average 69.8 69.3 63.8 69.4
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quite high at 77.5%. Four other Justices agree with O'Connor more
than two-thirds of the time - Souter 69.8%; Breyer 69.4%; Thomas
69.3%; and Scalia 68.6%. Justice Ginsburg had a slightly lower
agreement rate of 63.8%. Only Justice Stevens seemed to be at odds
with Justice O'Connor for nearly half of the Court's decisions during
this time; their agreement rate was just 53.7%.82  Taken together,
these agreement rates suggest that Justice O'Connor holds a
potentially powerful position on the Court.
While agreement rates are revealing and provide us with one
indication of Justice O'Connor's possible influence, another more
direct measure of ideology has been developed by Segal and Cover.83
The Segal-Cover score is derived from content analyses of newspaper
editorials written by each Justice prior to confirmation; scores range
from -1.00 (extremely conservative) to 1.00 (extremely liberal). The
value of this measure is that it is independent of the Justice's case
votes, and thus, can be used to explain and predict their votes. While
the scores in Table 5 suggest unexpected positions for a few of the
Justices,84 they do provide one way of comparing the Justice's
ideologies relative to each other. Few people would be surprised to
find Justice Scalia with the most conservative score, followed by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, and Justices Breyer and
Ginsburg with the most liberal scores.
82. During the 1999 term, Justices Stevens and O'Connor had an astoundingly low
agreement rate of 26.0%. If we consider the 1999 figure to be an outlier and recalculate the
average agreement rate without it, the result is 57.2%, still below the average agreement rates
with the other Justices.
83. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 557 (1989). See also Jeffrey A. Segal et al.,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812,
816 tbl. 2 (1995).
84. For examples of other scholars who have used the Segal-Covers scores, see Terry
Bowen, Ideology and Non-Traditional Policies: Energy, the Environment and Technology in
the Supreme Court, presented at the Southern Political Science Association Annual Meeting
(1992) (on file with author); Richard Kearney and Reginald Sheehan, Supreme Court Decision
Making: The Impact of Court Composition on State and Local Government Litigation, 54 J.
POL. 1008 (1992); William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution?, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 87 (1993); Jeffrey Segal, Charles
Cameron and Albert Cover, A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents,
Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations, 36 AM. J. POL. So. 96
(1992); Reginald Sheehan, William Mishler, and Donald Songer, Ideology, Status, and the
Differential Success of Direct Parties Before the Supreme Court, 86 AM. POL. So. REV. 464
(1992). For a critique of the Segal-Cover Scores and this approach in general, see Lee Epstein
& Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 261 (1996);
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2000).
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Based on the Segal-Cover scores, Justice O'Connor, with a
-0.17, is not in the ideological center of this natural Court, but rather
the third most liberal member of the bench, behind Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer. This would suggest that she is not the "pivot point" that
would be expected of a Justice who is a swing vote on the Court.
Table 5. Justices' Ideological Value and Civil Liberties Vote.
Justice Ideological Value Civil Liberties Vote
Scalia -1.00 31.2 (3rd)
Rehnquist -0.91 28.5 (1st)
Thomas -0.68 29.2 (2nd)
Stevens -.50 71.7 (91h)
Souter -.34 63.6 (8th)
Kennedy -.27 39.7 ( 5th)
O'Connor -.17 37.3 (4 th)
Breyer -0.05 62.7 (7th)
Ginsburg 0.36 58.8 (6th)
Justices are listed in order of their ideological values, from most conservative to least
conservative. The Ideological Value, also known as the Segal-Cover score, is derived from
content analyses of newspaper editorials prior to confirmation. It ranges from -1.00 (extremely
conservative) to 1.00 (extremely liberal). Civil Liberties Vote represents the percent of liberal
(pro-plaintiff) votes for that justice in this issue area for the 1993-1999 terms. Numbers in
parentheses are the rankings of support for civil liberties (from least to most supportive).
Ideological values from Jeffrey A Segal, Lee Epstein, Charles M. Cameron, and Harold J.
Spaeth, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL.
812, 816 (1995).
Civil Liberties Votes from Karen O'Connor and Barbara Palmer, The Clinton Clones:
Ginsburg, Breyer, and the Clinton Legacy, 84 JUDICATURE 267 (2001), Table 4, Pro-Civil
Liberties Voting of the Justices, 1993-1999 terms, at 267. Data for Justice Breyer are for the
1994-1999 terms.
Further analysis, however, suggests that at least in some cases,
such as those involving civil liberties, Justice O'Connor might be the
swing vote. The second column of Table 5 presents the percent of
liberal votes on civil liberties cases for the 1993-1999 terms.85 Justice
Stevens has the highest level of liberal votes (of the Justices included
in the analyses) with a score of 71.7%; Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Justices Thomas and Scalia take the liberal, pro-liberties position the
85. See Table 5 for a complete description of the data. Liberal civil liberties votes are
defined as "those that favor the criminally accused, the civil liberties/rights claimant indigents,
and Native Americans, and that are against the government in due process and privacy
litigation." Segal, supra note 83, at 815.
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least often, with rates of 28.5%, 29.2%, and 31.2% respectively.
Justice O'Connor follows Justice Scalia, casting pro-civil liberties
votes in 37.3% of these cases. The fifth rank or median position in
these cases is held by Justice Kennedy, with a rate of 39.7%.86 The
remaining three Justices are clustered together with strongly pro-civil
liberties voting rates. Taken together, the ideological positioning
measures suggest that Justice O'Connor does not occupy the exact
middle of the Court, yet her position is not far from the center.
Combined with her agreement rates, this does suggest that she has a
position of power on the Court.
Beyond ideological position, analyses of swing voting often
focus on 5-4 decisions. Table 6 shows how often each of the Justices
voted in the majority in cases decided by a 5-4 vote during the 1994-
2002 terms. In these cases, Justice O'Connor leads the Court in
frequency of voting with the majority, with 76.9%."7 In other words,
over three-fourths of the time, Justice O'Connor is on the winning side
in cases decided by one vote. Justice Kennedy followed closely with
74.4%. The bottom of the list features the four relatively "liberal"
Justices (Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg), who only voted with
the majority in 5-4 decisions approximately 40% of the time.
86. While Justice Kennedy's median position is found at 39.7%, the mean or average
position on this message is actually 46.9%. Thus, the ideological center of the Court on civil
liberties cases falls somewhere between Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg, but somewhat closer
to Justice Kennedy.
87. The Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372, 375 (1994-1995); The Statistics, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 340, 343 (1995-1996); The Statistics, 110 HARv. L. REV. 367, 370 (1996-1997); The
Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REv. 431, 434 (1997-1998); The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366,
371 (1998-1999); The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 405 (1999-2000); The Statistics, 114
HARV. L. REV. 390, 395 (2000-2001); The Statistics, 115 HARv. L. REV. 539, 544 (2001-
2002); The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 458 (2002-2003). Partial dissents were counted
as voting with minority. The Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372 n.e (1994-1995); The
Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340, 340 n.e (1995-1996); The Statistics, 110 HARv. L. REv. 367,
367 n.e (1996-1997); The Statistics, 111 HARV. L. REV. 431, 431 n.e (1997-1998); The
Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 366 n.e (1998-1999); The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400,
400 n.e (1999-2000); The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 390 n.e (2000-2001); The
Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 539 n.e (2001-2002); The Statistics, 116 HARV. L. REV. 453,
453 n.e (2002-2003).
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Table 6. Percentage of Votes with Majority in 5-4 Decisions for 1994-
2002 Terms.
Justice Votes with majority Number of cases
in 5-4 cases
O'Connor 76.9 120
Kennedy 74.4 116
Rehnquist 64.7 101
Thomas 63.5 99
Scalia 60.9 95
Stevens 40.4 63
Souter 40.4 63
Breyer 39.7 62
Ginsburg 37.8 59
Justices are listed by their ranking in votes with majority (from most to least). There were 156
5-4 decisions in the years examined. Data compiled from Harvard Law Review, 1995-2003,
Statistics, Table ID 5-4 Decisions (partial dissents counted as voting with minority).
Although the evidence in Table 6 suggests that Justice
O'Connor is potentially the key vote more often than her peers, the
fact remains that Justice Kennedy is in essentially the same position as
she is. Consequently, we expanded our assessment of 5-4 decisions
for Justices O'Connor and Kennedy; their annual majority voting rates
in 5-4 decisions for their entire tenure on the Court appear in Table 7.
The annual rates for each Justice show that Justice O'Connor cast
more majority votes in 5-4 decisions in some years, while Justice
Kennedy did so in other years. The bottom row of Table 7 provides
each Justice's total average rate for the entire length of their time
together on the bench (1987-2002 terms). Justice O'Connor's average
rate for this time period is 70.7%, while Justice Kennedy's average
rate is slightly higher at 72.5%. Clearly, by being in the majority in 5-
4 decisions almost three-quarters of the time, both Justices have
demonstrated their potential power in close cases, which suggests that
Justice Kennedy may also hold a key position on the Court.
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Table 7. Votes with majority in 5-4 decisions for Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy for 1981-2002 Terms.
Term O'Connor Kennedy 5-4
voting with voting with Cases
majority in 5- majority in 5-
4 decisions 4 decisions
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
41.9(13)
63.6 (21)
60.7 (17)
52.6 (10)
75.0 (27)
60.0 (27)
66.7 (8)
75.8 (25)
69.2 (27)
71.4 (15)
57.1 (8)
44.4(8)
53.8 (7)
68.7 (11)
81.8 (9)
72.2 (13)
66.7 (10)
68.7 (11)
83.3 (15)
77.8 (21)
80.9 (17)
92.9 (13)
66.7 (8)
84.8 (28)
66.7 (26)
61.9(13)
64.3 (9)
66.7 (12)
92.3 (12)
68.7(11)
81.8 (9)
77.8 (14)
86.7 (13)
68.7 (11)
72.2 (13)
77.8 (21)
71.4(15)
50.0 (7)
Average (all years) 67.5 (333) 498
Average (1987-2002) 70.7 (218) [72.5-(222) 337
Cell entries are the number of votes with majority in 5-4 decisions divided by the total number
of 5-4 decisions for the year. Actual numbers of votes with majority in these decisions appear
in parentheses. Data compiled from Harvard Law Review, 1982-2003, Statistics, Table ID 5-4
Decisions (partial dissents counted as voting with minority).
Continuing our examination of Justice O'Connor's role in 5-4
decisions, we change our focus to opinion writing in these decisions.
As suggested earlier, Table 1 revealed that, in general, the Court
follows the equality principle. However, a very different pattern
emerges in 5-4 decisions. While Justice O'Connor writes about as
many majority opinions as the other Justices, Table 8 shows that she
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writes substantially more than expected in 5-4 decisions. 88  Once
again, Chief Justice Rehnquist leads the Court in majority opinion
writing with 17.2% of the opinions written in 5-4 decisions (see the
first column of Table 8). Justices Kennedy and O'Connor follow
closely with 15.9% and 15.2% respectively. Justice Ginsburg has the
distinction of writing the fewest majority opinions in 5-4 decisions,
with just 4.0%. If the equality principle was utilized in 5-4 decisions,
only Justice Breyer is within 1% of the predicted result (11.1%) for
opinion writing in these cases. Apparently, in the most divisive cases,
majority opinions are not distributed equally, and Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor write more than their share.
88. The Statistics, 96 HARV. L. REV. 304, 307 (1982-1983); The Statistics, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 295, 298 (1983-1984); The Statistics, 98 HARV. L. REV. 307, 310 (1984-1985); The
Statistics, 99 HARV. L. REV. 322, 325 (1985-1986); The Statistics, 100 HARV. L. REV. 304, 307
(1986-1987); The Statistics, 101 HARV. L. REV. 362, 365 (1987-1988); The Statistics, 102
HARV. L. REV. 350, 353 (1988-1989); The Statistics, 104 HARV. L. REV. 359, 362 (1990-
1991); The Statistics, 105 HARV. L. REV. 419, 422 (1991-1992); The Statistics, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 378, 381 (1992-1993); The Statistics, 107 HARV. L. REV. 372, 375 (1993-1994); The
Statistics, 108 HARV. L. REV. 372, 375 (1994-1995); The Statistics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 340,
343 (1995-1996); The Statistics, 110 HARV. L. REV. 367, 370 (1996-1997); The Statistics, 111
HARV. L. REV. 431,434 (1997-1998); The Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 366, 371 (1998-1999);
The Statistics, 113 HARV. L. REV. 400, 405 (1999-2000); The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REV.
390, 395 (2000-2001); The Statistics, 115 HARV. L. REV. 539, 544 (2001-2002); The Statistics,
116 HARV. L. REV. 453, 458 (2002-2003). Partial dissents were counted as voting with
minority.
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Table 8. Opinion Writing for the Court in 5-4 Decisions for 1994-
2002 Terms.
Five of the 5-4 cases were Per Curiam decisions. Cell entries are percentages of total
decisions with actual number of opinions in parentheses. Justices are listed by their ranking in
majority opinion writing (from most to least). Data compiled from Harvard Law Review,
1995-2003, Statistics, Table ID 5-4 Decisions. 5-4 decisions identified from Table ID notes.
Opinion writing information gathered through Lexis.
The second column of Table 8 shows the concurrence rates for
the Justices during the 1994-2002 terms in 5-4 decisions. As with
majority voting patterns, the findings here are at odds with our earlier
findings for opinion writing in all cases during this time frame.
Although Justice O'Connor has written an average number of
concurring opinions in general, she led her colleagues in concurrences
in 5-4 decisions. Justice O'Connor's concurrence rate in these cases
was 11.5%. Our previous analysis of concurrences in all cases found
that Justice Scalia was the leading concurrer by a wide margin, yet in
5-4 decisions, his concurrence rate drops to 9.0%, the same rate
reached by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. s9 What all of this suggests
is that when the Court is closely divided, Justice O'Connor not only
speaks for the Court in majority opinions more often than many of her
colleagues, but she also feels compelled to distinguish her reasoning in
cases with the smallest of majorities.
89. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Souter each wrote only one concurring opinion,
thus concurring in less than 1% of the 5-4 decisions.
Justice Majority Concurrence Dissent
Rehnquist 17.2 (26) 0.6(1) 7.7(12)
Kennedy 15.9(24) 9.0(14) 8.3 (13)
O'Connor 15.2 (23) 11.5 (18) 12.2 (19)
Breyer 10.6 (16) 3.8(6) 22.4 (35)
Souter 9.9 (15) 0.6 (1) 23.1 (36)
Stevens 9.3 (14) 6.4 (10) 30.1 (47)
Scalia 9.3 (14) 9.0 (14) 17.9 (28)
Thomas 8.6(13) 9.0(14) 14.1 (22)
Ginsburg 4.0 (6) 3.2 (5) 17.3 (27)
Total Decisions 151 156 156
Equality Principle 11.1(17) ...
(dividing total by 9)
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The pattern of dissenting opinions for 5-4 decisions shows
some similarities to what we found for opinion writing in all cases.
Once again, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor dissent less frequently than their colleagues, while Justice
Stevens writes dissenting opinions far more frequently than the other
Justices (30.1%). While one might expect the Justices at the
ideological extremes to dissent more frequently than their peers, in
fact, Jistices Scalia and Ginsburg ranked fourth and fifth, writing
dissenting opinions in 17.9% and 17.3% of 5-4 decisions
respectively.
90
Finally, we examined one more indicator of judicial influence,
her behavior in landmark decisions. For this measure, we borrowed
from Congressional Quarterly's list of "the Major Decisions of the
Court." 91 Table 9 shows how often each of the current Justices was in
the majority in major decisions. Once again, Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor have the highest level of majority votes among their
colleagues. Justice Kennedy voted with the majority in these cases
89.8% of the time; Justice O'Connor did the same 80.5% of the time.
When considered with our previous findings, this measure suggests
that both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have a substantial level of
influence in the Court's most important cases, with Justice Kennedy
clearly having the edge over Justice O'Connor here.
90. As one would expect, every Justice's dissent rate increased in 5-4 decisions relative
to their rates for all decisions of the Court.
91. LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS &
DEVELOPMENTS 133-140 tbl. 2-12 (3d ed. 2003). The two sets of cases, 5-4 decisions and
"Major Decisions of the Court," obviously overlap somewhat. Bush v. Gore, 532 U.S. 98
(2000), for example, was a 5-4 decision that, surprisingly, was not considered a "Major
Decision of the Court" for the 2000 term. Nonetheless, some 5-4 decisions were not
considered to be "Major Decisions of the Court" by CQ, and some of CQ's Major Decisions
were not 5-4 decisions. For the 1994-2002 terms, the total number of cases included by CQ
(88) is considerably smaller than the number of 5-4 decisions (156). Id.
CQ's Major Decisions of the Court are differentiated from other decisions of the Court
based on whether the decision goes beyond the immediate impact of answering the
individual's claims in the case. A major decision has "larger significance, upholding or
striking down similar laws or practices or claims, establishing the Court's authority in new
areas, or finding that some areas lie outside its competence." JOAN BISKUPIC AND ELDER WITT,
THE SUPREME COURT AT WORK 334 (1997).
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Table 9. Majority Votes in Congressional Quarterly's "Major
Decisions of the Court" for 1994-2002 Terms.
Justice Majority votes in CQ's "Major
Decisions of the Court"
Kennedy 89.8 (79)
O'Connor 80.5 (70)
Rehnquist 70.4 (62)
Thomas 66.7 (58)
Scalia 62.5 (55)
Breyer 61.4 (54)
Souter 57.9 (51)
Ginsburg 54.5 (48)
Stevens 50.0 (44)
Percentages are calculated based on total cases for which each justice participated-O'Connor
and Thomas each sat out for one "major case". Actual numbers of majority votes appear in
parentheses. The total number of cases included in the table is 88. Data compiled from Lee
Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, and Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court
Compendium (CQ Press, 2003) Table 2-12, at 133-140.
The data for majority opinion writing in major decisions is
presented in Table 10. In these cases, the equality principle is not
applied. Chief Justice Rehnquist was the most frequent majority
opinion writer, penning 19.8% of the opinions, which is not surprising,
given that he is the Chief.92  But Justice O'Connor ranked second,
writing majority opinions for 17.6% of the landmark cases in which
she participated. Ranking a very close third is Justice Stevens, with a
rate of 17.4%.93 Justice Kennedy rounds out the group of Justices who
wrote more majority opinions than the equality principle predicts. The
remaining Justices wrote majority opinions in less than 9% of the
major decisions of the Court.
The data for majority opinion writing in major decisions (Table
10) allow for some comparisons with the data for majority opinion
writing in 5-4 decisions (first column of Table 8). As expected, Chief
Justice Rehnquist ranks first in majority opinion writing across the
board; he writes more majority opinions in 5-4 decisions and
landmark cases than all of his colleagues. Justice O'Connor also ranks
near the top according to both measures, third in 5-4 decisions, and
92. Slotnick, supra note 69, at 67; REHNQUIST, supra note 63, at 297.
93. Justice O'Connor and Justice Stevens actually wrote the same number of majority
decisions in these cases. However, because Justice O'Connor sat out for one case, she has a
slightly higher percentage of the majority opinion writing share.
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second in landmark decisions. Justice Kennedy ranked just behind the
Chief Justice in majority opinion writing in 5-4 decisions, but he drops
to fourth place in landmark cases.
94
Our assessment of Justice O'Connor's role in landmark
decisions is that she does exercise a substantial level of influence in
her voting and opinion writing behavior. While Justice Kennedy might
have slightly more influence according to our voting analysis for these
cases, Justice O'Connor has more influence on the development of the
law by writing more than her share of majority opinions in the most
important cases decided by the Court.
Table 10. Percentage of Majority Opinion Writing in Congressional
Quarterly's "Major Decisions of the Court" for 1994-2002 Terms.
Justice Majority opinion writing in CQ's
"Major Decisions of the Court"
Rehnquist 19.8 (17)
O'Connor 17.6 (15)
Stevens 17.4 (15)
Kennedy 12.8 (11)
Thomas 8.2 (7)
Scalia 8.1 (7)
Souter 7.0(6)
Ginsburg 5.8 (5)
Breyer 3.5 (3)
Percentages are calculated based on total cases in which each justice participated - O'Connor
and Thomas each sat out for one of these major cases. There were 86 cases used in this table
(after 2 Per Curiam decisions were excluded). Data compiled from Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A.
Segal, Harold J. Spaeth, and Thomas G. Walker, The Supreme Court Compendium (CQ Press,
2003) Table 2-12, at 133-140.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In terms of overall opinion writing, Justice O'Connor writes
neither more nor fewer majority opinions than her colleagues for all
cases decided by the Court. Her concurrence rates are similarly
unremarkable; she writes concurring opinions at approximately the
same rate as most of the other Justices throughout her tenure on the
94. Somewhat surprisingly, Justice Stevens ranked third in majority opinion writing in
landmark decisions, despite ranking sixth for 5-4 decisions.
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bench. Thus, at least based on the numbers, she hardly deserves the
title "great concurrer," 95 a title she should hand over to Justice Scalia,
who truly concurs more frequently than all other Justices.
On the other hand, Justice O'Connor's position as a potential
swing voter indicates that she is in a position to exercise considerable
power. She may not be at the exact ideological center of the Court, but
she is close enough to play a key role, particularly on cases with
fragile coalitions, and the bottom line is that most of the time, most of
the other Justices agree with her. Her voting behavior in 5-4 and
landmark decisions indicates that she does vote with the majority more
often than most of her colleagues. Yet, it is important to keep in mind
that we also found that Justice Kennedy votes with the majority in
these decisions slightly more frequently than Justice O'Connor does.
Finally, our assessment of opinion writing for these two important
classes of cases finds that the equality principle does not apply; Justice
O'Connor writes more than her predicted share of the majority
opinions in 5-4 and landmark decisions. Additionally, we identified a
circumstance under which Justice O'Connor could earn the "great
concurrer" title after all; in 5-4 decisions she concurred more
frequently than all of her colleagues.
Ultimately, we conclude that the evidence regarding Justice
O'Connor's position and influence on the Court is, to some extent,
mixed. Our initial analysis of overall opinion writing shows that she is
one of nine, having no more or less influence than her colleagues.
However, further analyses of particular types of decisions, such as
civil liberties, cases decided by one vote, and landmark opinions,
suggest a very different picture. It is in these cases, arguably the most
important decisions by the Court, that she takes the lead.
Given that these are precisely the kinds of cases that receive
the most media attention, all the hyperbole in the press about her as
"the most powerful jurist/woman in America/the world" is perhaps not
unexpected. On the other hand, it is clear that Justice Kennedy ranks
as high as O'Connor does on some of our indicators of judicial
influence, yet the media have never proclaimed that "we are all living
in Justice Anthony Kennedy's America." Justice Kennedy has never
been referred to as "the real chief." It seems that journalists are much
more inclined to ascribe tremendous power to Justice O'Connor.
95. Wohl, supra note 30, at 42.
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A possible explanation for this may lie within the political
psychology literature on media impact. Shanto Iyengar and Donald
Kinder explain that the media are quite effective in influencing what
people will consider as important issues by setting the agenda through
the editorial process of story selection.96 In other words, the media
cannot make the public more liberal or more conservative on, for
example, crime issues, but if the number of stories on crime increases,
people will think that the crime rate is increasing.97  A similar
phenomenon may have happened with Justice O'Connor. She is a
compelling story: she grew up on a ranch in the southwest, and she
graduated at the top of her law school class, but could not find a job
because she was a woman. Moreover, her presence on the Court has a
clear visual impact - she was the first female U.S. Supreme Court
Justice. Justice Kennedy, in contrast, came to the Court as President
Reagan's third choice after the failed nominations of Robert Bork and
Douglas Ginsburg. Given this contrast, it is not surprising Justice
O'Connor has been the beneficiary of substantial media coverage since
her nomination to the Court in 1981.98 And since she receives more
press coverage proclaiming that she is the most powerful justice, then
this will be the public's perception of her, regardless of the statistics.
96. SHANTO IYENGAR AND DONALD KINDER, NEWS THAT MATTERS: TELEVISION AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION (1987).
97. See, e.g., Mark Warr, The Accuracy of Public Beliefs about Crime, 59 Soc. FORCES
456 (1980).
98. This sizeable media coverage probably explains why Justice O'Connor is the best
known among the Justices. According to a 1989 survey that asked people to name Supreme
Court Justices, she was the most frequently named Justice, with 23% of respondents naming
her. Chief Justice Rehnquist lagged behind substantially with just 9%, followed by Justice
Kennedy at 7%, Justice Scalia at 6% and the others with 5% or less. Justice Stevens was
named by merely 1% of the respondents. Of the 1005 respondents to the survey, 71% could
not name any Justice and only 2 respondents correctly identified all nine Justices. See
EPSTEIN, supra note 91, at 741.
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